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Technology, information, and the decentralization of the firm
Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between the diffusion of new technologies and the decentralization
of firms. Centralized control relies on the information of the principal, which we equate with publicly
available information. Decentralized control, on the other hand, delegates authority to a manager with
superior information. However, the manager can use her informational advantage to make choices that
are not in the best interest of the principal. As the available public information about the specific
technology increases, the trade-off shifts in favor of centralization. We show that firms closer to the
technological frontier, firms in more heterogeneous environments and younger firms are more likely to
choose decentralization. Using three datasets of French and British firms in the 1990s, we report robust
correlations consistent with these predictions.
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I. Introduction
Recent years have witnessed increasing interest in the determinants of rms' orga-
nizational choices. This interest is partly motivated by the belief that new technologies
are inducing rms to become less hierarchical and more decentralized. Despite this inter-
est, there is limited work on the determinants of the decentralization decisions of rms.
This paper undertakes a theoretical and empirical investigation of how the allocation of
authority within rms changes as the information structure in an industry evolves.
We develop a simple model where rms make choices on how to implement new tech-
nologies. Dierent organizational forms are distinguished by the amount of information
they use in these decisions. As in Aghion and Tirole [1997], centralized control relies more
on the information of the principal, which we equate with publicly available information
about past implementations of similar technologies.1 Decentralized control delegates au-
thority to a manager, who potentially possesses more information than available in the
public history. Nevertheless, because the interests of the principal and the manager are
not perfectly aligned, the manager can use his informational advantage to make choices
that are not in the best interest of the principal. This trade-o between the superior
knowledge of the manager and the agency costs of managerial delegation determines the
optimal degree of decentralization. The main focus of our analysis is on how learning
from the experiences of other rms changes this trade-o. Typically, the more a principal
learns from other rms regarding the implementation of new technologies, the less she
needs to delegate control to the manager.
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Using this basic framework we derive three sets of empirical predictions:
1. Firms closer to the technological frontier are more likely to choose decentraliza-
tion, because they are dealing with new technologies about which there is only limited
information in the public history.
2. Firms in more heterogeneous environments are more likely to be decentralized
because greater heterogeneity makes learning from the experiences of others more dicult.
3. Young rms, that have had a limited history to learn about their own specic
needs, are also more likely to be decentralized than older rms.
The bulk of the paper investigates these predictions using two large datasets of French
rms and establishments and one smaller set of British establishments in the 1990s. We
document a range of empirical patterns consistent with these predictions; rms closer to
the technology frontier of their industry, rms operating in more heterogeneous environ-
ments and younger rms are more likely to choose decentralization.
In addition, since our theoretical approach emphasizes the importance of learning
about the implementation of new technologies, we also separately look at high-tech in-
dustries (dened as those using information technology intensively). Consistent with our
theoretical approach, we nd that the relationship between heterogeneity or distance to
frontier and decentralization is signicantly stronger in high-tech than in low-tech indus-
tries.
Our main measure of decentralization is whether dierent units of the rm are or-
ganized into \prot centers". We also show that our main results are robust to proxying
decentralization by the extent of delayering or measures of managerial autonomy over
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investment decisions. The results are also robust to the inclusion of a large number of
controls, to using various dierent measures of heterogeneity and to dierent estimation
strategies.
On the theoretical side, our paper is most closely related to the literature on the costs
and benets of delegation or decentralization in rms. A rst strand of this literature, for
example Baron and Besanko [1992] and Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein [1995],
investigate the conditions for delegated contracting to replicate the constrained ecient
centralized contracting. As emphasized by Mookherjee [2006], however, the presence of
complete contracts in these models implies that delegation can at best replicate the con-
strained ecient allocation, which is also achievable by centralized contracting. A second
strand emphasizes information processing and communication costs as determinants of
centralization or decentralization in rms.2 Although we also stress the importance of
learning, our focus is dierent, namely on how public information aects how much au-
tonomy the principal would like to grant to the agent. Closer to our paper are the recent
models emphasizing the trade-o between loss of control and better information under
decentralization|in particular, Aghion and Tirole [1997], Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy
[1999], Rajan and Zingales [2001], Dessein [2002], and Hart and Moore [2005].3 The main
dierences between these papers and ours are twofold: rst, because there are no incentive
eects of the form of the organization, our framework is signicantly simpler and allows
us to focus on the basic trade-o between information and loss of control; second; we
allow the principal to learn from other rms' or from their own past experience, which is
the source of all the comparative static results we investigate in the empirical work.4
The main contribution of our paper is the empirical evidence we provide on the de-
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terminants of decentralization. Previous work in the literature focuses on the general
move towards \atter" organizations.5 Rajan and Wulf [2006] provide the most system-
atic statistical description of recent organizational trends, showing a strong movement
towards atter corporations in the United States between 1986 and 1999. Caroli and Van
Reenen [2001] and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt [2002] report a positive association
between various measures of decentralization and organizational change on the one hand
and information technology (and human capital) on the other. Baker and Hubbard [2003,
2004] document the eect of new technologies (on-board computers) on ownership pat-
terns in the US trucking industry. Other related papers include Colombo and Delmastro
[2004], who present empirical models of decentralization in Italian manufacturing plants,
Lerner and Merges [1998], who examine the allocation of control rights in biotechnology
alliances, and the papers by Black and Lynch [2001], Ichinowski, Prenushi, and Shaw
[1997] and Janod and Saint-Martin [2004], which examine the impact of human resource
practices and rm reorganization on productivity. None of these papers investigate the
relationship between decentralization (or organizational change) and distance to frontier
or heterogeneity.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents some pre-
liminary data description to motivate the basic theoretical framework, which is developed
in Section III. Section IV describes the data and our main econometric specication. Sec-
tion V presents the empirical results. Section VI concludes. Appendix A, which contains
a more detailed exposition of the theory and the proofs from Section III, and Appendix
B, which contains additional data description and robustness checks, are available upon
request and on the Web.6
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II. Basic Patterns
To motivate our focus in the paper, we rst present some salient patterns from a
database of several thousand French manufacturing rms, the \Changements Organisa-
tionnels et Informatisation" (COI). This dataset, as well as our two other datasets are
described below. Our key indicator for decentralization from the COI is whether a rm
is organized into prot centers or whether it is more centrally controlled with divisions
organized as cost or production centers. A manager of a prot center is concerned with
all aspects of the business that contribute to protability, while managers in charge of
production centers focus on output targets and managers of cost centers target costs.
When a rm organizes its divisions into prot centers, it typically delegates substantially
more authority to its managers (see the discussion in Section IV).
Figures 1-3 show the proportion of over 3,570 rms that are decentralized into prot
centers broken down by various rm characteristics. Figure 1 divides rms into deciles
depending on the \heterogeneity" of the rm's environment. Heterogeneity is measured
as the dierence between log productivity (value-added per hour) growth at the 90th and
the 10th percentiles of the relevant four-digit industry. This variable is a natural measure
of technological heterogeneity among rms within a four-digit industry; it will be greater
in industries where some rms are experiencing much faster productivity growth than
others. The construction of this variable is discussed in greater detail in Section IV.
Figure 1 shows a general increase in the probability of decentralization as we move
from the rms in the least heterogeneous industries to the most heterogeneous industries;
while 24% of the rms are decentralized in the second decile, this number is 41% in the
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tenth decile. The rst decile is somewhat anomalous, but closer investigation shows that
there is a disproportionately large number of less productive and older rms in these
sectors, aspects which we now turn to.
Figure 2 plots the fraction of rms decentralized into prot centers against the \prox-
imity to the frontier" (measured as the ratio of the rm's value added per hour to the value
added per hour of the rm at the 99th percentile of the distribution in the same four-digit
industry). While 27% of the rms in the bottom quintile of the proximity distribution are
decentralized, of the rms in the top quintile, which are closer to the technology frontier,
38% are decentralized.
Finally, Figure 3 shows that younger rms are, on average, more decentralized than
older rms: about 45% of the rms under the age of ve years are decentralized compared
to a rate of 30% for the older rms.
In the rest of the paper, we document that the patterns shown in Figures 1-3 are
robust to a variety of controls, dierent estimation techniques and dierent measures ap-
proximating our theoretical concepts. For example, we show that the same broad patterns
apply when we use the variation in productivity levels within four-digit industries (rather
than productivity growth) and also a rm-specic index of heterogeneity, measuring the
\distance" between the product mix of a rm and those by other rms in the population
of French rms. We also show that our main results are robust to using alternative mea-
sures of decentralization, including measures of delayering and managerial autonomy over
investment decisions (the age results are somewhat weaker with some of these alternative
measures of decentralization).
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Overall, the patterns in Figures 1-3, and our more detailed results below, suggest that
rms that operate in more heterogeneous environments, that are closer to the technologi-
cal frontier, and that are younger are more likely to be decentralized. These correlations,
especially the relationship between decentralization and heterogeneity, indicate that in-
formation acquisition and learning may the important factors in the decentralization de-
cisions of rms. In particular, rms in more heterogeneous environments, those closer
to the technology frontier and younger rms naturally face greater uncertainty regarding
their business decisions in general and the optimal implementation of new technologies in
particular compared to rms that are in more homogeneous environments, farther from
the frontier and more experienced. This motivates our theoretical approach emphasizing
the relationship between learning and decentralization, which is presented in the next
section. Although there may be alternative explanations for some of our ndings, we
are not aware of other approaches that can explain the evidence as satisfactorily as our
theoretical framework.
III. Theory
In this section, we describe a theoretical environment linking information and tech-
nology choices to decentralization decisions. Our purpose is to highlight a number of
implications that will be investigated in the empirical work below. More details on the
theoretical framework, as well as the proofs of all the results stated here, are contained
in the working paper version, Acemoglu et al. [2006], as well as in Appendix A.
Suppose that there is a ladder of technologies, k = 1; 2; :::. At each point in time,
t = 1; 2; ::, each rm i has previously implemented up to some technology, say k  1. The
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next technology in the ladder, k, becomes available to this rm with probability pi 2 (0; 1].
The parameter pi thus measures the speed at which rm i climbs the technology ladder.
The realizations of technological opportunities are independent across rms and over time.
When a new technology becomes available to a rm, it decides how to implement it. In
particular, the rm chooses between two actions, L and R, which correspond to two
dierent choices in the implementation of the new technology. Dropping the time index,
the choice of the rm is denoted by xi;k 2 fL;Rg. One of these choices, xi;k 2 fL;Rg,
leads to successful implementation, while the other leads to an unsuccessful outcome. We
will refer to xi;k as the correct action. Successful implementation of a technology increases
the rm's productivity by a factor  > 1, while unsuccessful implementation leaves the
productivity of the rm unchanged.
We assume that the successful action for rm i in the implementation of technology
k is given by
(1) xi;k =

xk with probability 1  "
 xk with probability " ;
where xk 2 fL;Rg is the reference action for technology k,  xk denotes \not xk" (i.e.,
if xk = L, then  xk = R) and 0 < " < 1=2. Conditional on xk, the realizations of xi;k
and xi0;k for any i 6= i0 are independent.7 We assume that, for each technology, the prior
probability that L (or R) is the reference action is equal to 1=2.
This specication implies that there is a generally correct (\conventional") way of
implementing each technology, given by the reference action, but dierences in rms'
specic needs and competencies imply that some rms need to take a dierent action for
successful implementation. Equation (1) thus makes it clear that " is a measure of the
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heterogeneity among rms: when " is equal to zero, the reference action is the correct
action for all rms; when " is equal to 1/2, the correct action is unrelated across rms.
Each rm is owned by a principal who maximizes its value conditional on the public
information available. Successful implementation and hence prots depend on the or-
ganization of the rm. The two alternative organizational forms available to each rm
are: centralization and delegation. With centralization (denoted by di;k = 0), the prin-
cipal manages the rm and chooses xi;k; with delegation (di;k = 1), the choice of xi;k is
delegated to a manager.
The principal in rm i has no special skills in identifying the right action. Therefore,
under centralization she bases her decision on the history of publicly available information
relevant for technology k at the time of its decision, denoted by hik. In contrast, the
manager of rm i observes the correct action xi;k, so that he knows exactly which action
will lead to successful implementation. However, his interests may not be aligned with
those of the owner. Following Aghion and Tirole [1997], we model this in a reduced form
way, and assume that the preferred action of the manager for technology k is given by
(2) zi;k =

xi;k with probability 
 xi;k with probability 1   :
This specication implies that  is a measure of congruence between the rm's and the
manager's objectives. Notice that equation (2) implies that the manager is informed
about the right action for this particular rm (not only about the right reference action).
We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions to focus on the main implications
of this framework. First, we assume that the relationship between the rm and each
manager is short-term. Second, when xi;k = z

i;k, the manager obtains a private benet.
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We assume that managers are credit constrained and cannot compensate principals for
these private benets and that these private benets are suciently large that it is not
protable for the principal to use an incentive contract to induce the manager to take the
right action. These assumptions imply that delegation will lead to the implementation of
the action that is preferred by the manager; thus, when there is delegation, xi;k = z

i;k.
8
Finally, we assume that  2 (1=2; 1  "), which implies that the manager's interests
are more likely to be aligned with those of the principal than otherwise ( > 1=2) and
that the conict of interest between the principal and the manager is suciently severe
that a principal who knows the reference action is more likely to make the correct choice
if she, rather than the manager, decides ( < 1  ").
The organizational form and implementation decisions by the principal of rm i for
technology k depend on the history of public information hik, which includes the outcomes
of all previous attempts with technology k (in particular, which actions were chosen and
whether they led to successful implementation). Since conditional on xk the success or
failure of dierent rms in the past are independent, all payo-relevant information can
be summarized by hik = fnik; ~nikg: nik is the number of rms that have attempted to
implement this technology before rm i, and ~nik  nik is the number of rms for whom
L turned out to be the protable action.9 Note also that nik is a direct measure of
distance to the technology frontier. If nik is high, it means that many other rms have
implemented technology k before rm i. Therefore, comparative statics with respect to
nik will be informative about the impact of the distance to the technology frontier on
decentralization decisions.
Let  (di;k;h
i
k) denote the probability that rm i chooses the correct action conditional
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on history hik and the organizational form di;k. It can be shown that prot maximization
in this context is equivalent to maximizing  (di;k;h
i
k) in every period (see Acemoglu et
al. [2006]). Hence, the principal will choose di;k = 1 (delegation) if  (di;k = 1;h
i
k) >
 (di;k = 0;h
i
k).
The above discussion establishes that when the principal chooses delegation,  (1;hik) =
. On the other hand, under centralization, i.e., di;k = 1, the principal makes the opti-
mal implementation decision given the publicly available information. Consequently, the
probability of success when the principal chooses centralization,  (0;hik), is a stochastic
variable that depends on history hik, thus both on the rm's distance to the frontier, n
i
k,
and on the experiences of rms that have previously implemented the technology, ~nik. As
the distance to frontier, nik, increases, the history available to the principal expands and
she learns the reference action xk with greater precision. More specically, when rm
i is at the technology frontier, so that nik = 0, the principal has no useful information
and  (0;hik) = 1=2. In contrast, as the principal observes the experiences of suciently
many other rms, the probability that she chooses the correct action under centralization
increases. In particular, it can be shown that p limnik !1  (0;h
i
k) = 1 ".10 This implies
that when nik is small,  (0;h
i
k) will be less than  (1;h
i
k) =  > 1=2, but as n
i
k increases,
it will approach 1   " and thus exceed  (1;hik) =  (since  < 1   "). This argument
establishes that delegation will be chosen by rms closer to the technology frontier, but
not by those that are suciently behind. Denoting the optimal organizational choice
given history hik by d

i;k (h
i
k), we can therefore establish the following result.
Proposition 1 (Distance to Frontier) Consider the adoption decision of technology
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k by rm i, and suppose that  2 (1=2; 1  "). Then:
(i) For a rm at the technology frontier, i.e., nik = 0, the principal chooses delega-
tion, di;k (h
i
k) = 1.
(ii) For a rm suciently far from the technology frontier, i.e., nik !1 , the princi-
pal (almost surely) chooses centralization. That is, p limnik !1 d

i;k (h
i
k = fnik; ~nikg) =
0.
In the empirical analysis, we proxy distance to the technology frontier with the gap
between the productivity of a particular rm and the highest productivity (or the highest
percentile productivity) in the same industry. Firms that are further behind the frontier
(i.e., those with higher nik's) will be less productive because they have been unlucky in
the past and have had fewer opportunities to adopt technologies, and also because these
are typically the rms with lower pi's that are slower in climbing the technology ladder.
Using this proxy, we test the prediction that centralization increases with the distance to
the frontier.11
Our next result links the parameter of heterogeneity, ", to rms' decentralization
decisions. Let Pr
 
di;k (h
i
k) = 1

be the unconditional probability that rm i will choose
delegation when implementing technology k.
Proposition 2 (Heterogeneity) Consider the adoption decision of technology k by rm
i. Given the distance to frontier nik, an increase in heterogeneity, "; makes delegation
more likely. That is, @ Pr
 
di;k (h
i
k) = 1

=@"  0.
Intuitively, when " is small, there is less heterogeneity in the environment and the
performance of rms that have implemented the same technology in the past reveals more
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information about the reference action. Consequently, when " is small, rms' posterior
beliefs are more responsive to public information. In other words, given a history hik,
@ (0;hik) =@"  0, so that as " increases, delegation becomes more attractive at each
history hik.
12 The complication in the proof comes from the fact that a change in " also
aects the likelihood of dierent histories. Nevertheless, it can be proved that a greater
" changes the ex ante distribution of dierent histories in a direction that also increases
the probability of delegation.
Proposition 2 provides the most interesting testable implication of our approach; it
suggests that there should be more decentralization in industries with greater dispersion
of performance across rms and also for rms that are more dissimilar to others. In the
empirical section, we proxy heterogeneity using three dierent measures. First, we use the
dispersion of productivity growth within a four-digit industry. This is a natural measure
since a higher " corresponds to greater variability in the successful implementation of a
given technology and thus to greater variability in productivity growth. Second, we check
these results using the dispersion in levels of productivity within an industry. Finally, we
use a rm-level proxy for heterogeneity, the (IT-weighted) distance between the product
mix of a particular rm and those of other rms in the same industry, the idea being that
rms with a product mix that is more similar to others should be able to learn more from
past experiences of other rms.
In Acemoglu et al. [2006], we extended this framework to derive a relationship be-
tween rm age and organizational structure. Firms learn not only from other rms, but
also from their own past experiences. The implication of this extension is that younger
rms that have accumulated less \rm-specic" information are more likely choose del-
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egation. Motivated by this observation, in our empirical analysis we also investigate the
relationship between rm age and delegation.
IV. Econometric specication and data
A. Empirical strategy
In our empirical analysis, we will document a number of correlations motivated by
the theory presented in the previous section. Recall that the main predictions of our
approach are:
1. Delegation should be more common for rms closer to the technological frontier.
2. Delegation should be more prevalent in environments with greater heterogeneity.
3. Young rms should be more likely to choose delegation.
We investigate these predictions by studying the relationship between various ex-
planatory factors and decentralization decisions of several thousand French and British
rms. Consider the following econometric model for delegation:
(3) dilt = Hilt 1 + PFilt 1 + ageilt 1 +w
0
ilt 1 + uilt;
where i denotes rm, l denotes industry and t denotes time. dilt is a latent variable indicat-
ing the propensity to delegate authority to managers. Hilt 1 is a measure of heterogeneity,
PFilt 1 is a measure of \proximity to the frontier" (inverse measure of \distance to the
frontier"), ageilt 1 denotes the age of the rm and wilt 1 is a vector of other controls.
All right-hand side variables refer to t   1, while the dependent variable is for t, which
is an attempt to prevent the most obvious form of reverse causality. Nevertheless, we
do not view estimates from equation (3) as corresponding to causal eects, since there
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may be other omitted factors, simultaneously aecting both the (lagged) right-hand side
variables and the delegation decisions. All omitted factors are captured by the error term
uilt, which we assume to be normally distributed.
In all of our specications, we observe an indicator of decentralization, dilt 2 f0; 1g,
and in our baseline specications, we assume that
(4) dilt =

1 if dilt > 0
0 if dilt  0 ;
where dilt is given by (3). Equation (4), combined with the fact that uit is normally dis-
tributed, leads to the standard probit model (Wooldridge [2002]). We therefore estimate
(3) by maximum likelihood probit. We check the robustness of our results by using logit
and linear probability specications. Throughout, we report standard errors that are ro-
bust and allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance structure at the four-digit industry
level.
B. Data and measurement
We use two French and one UK datasets. The use of multiple datasets is an important
cross-validation of the robustness of our results. Our rst and main dataset, \Change-
ments Organisationnels et Informatisation" (COI), covers just over 4,000 manufacturing
rms.13 Using unique identiers, rms in this dataset are matched to the dataset FUTE,
which contains the entire population of French rms with more than 20 employees.14
Many of our right-hand side variables are constructed from the FUTE and thus refer to
this entire population. Since the COI contains some rms with less than 20 employees,
the match leaves us with a total of 3,570 rms for our basic analysis.
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Using the COI, we build a measure of decentralization based on the organization of
a rm's business units into prot centers (see Appendix B for a more detailed descrip-
tion). In practice, once a rm grows beyond a certain size it faces the choice of retaining
centralized control or allowing some decentralization. Firms are generally organized into
business units, with dierent degrees of responsibility delegated to the managers of these
units. While some rms retain complete command and control at the center, most create
some form of \responsibility centers" for business unit managers.15 These responsibil-
ity centers (from the most to the least decentralized) are prot centers, cost centers and
revenue centers. Our key indicator for decentralization is whether the rm is organized
primarily into prot centers. When a rm organizes into prot centers, the manager
keeps track of both revenues and costs with the aim of maximizing prots. He is given
considerable autonomy in the purchase of assets, hiring of personnel, the management of
inventories and determination of bonuses and promotions.16 In contrast, a cost (revenue)
center manager is responsible only for costs (revenue). Milgrom and Roberts [1992, pp.
229-230] contrast cost and prot centers managers as follows: \Managers who are given
responsibility for prots, for example, are commonly given broader decision authority
than those responsible just for costs or sales." Overall about 30% of French rms in our
sample are organized into prot centers.
Our second dataset, the \Enque^te Reponse" (ER), is a survey of just under 3,000
French establishments covering all sectors of the economy conducted in 1998. This dataset
is also matched with the FUTE to construct the right-hand side variables, which leaves
us with a dataset of around 2,200 establishments. In this dataset, delegation can be
measured in two ways. First, there is a direct question asked to plant managers regarding
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the degree of autonomy they enjoy in investment decisions relative to headquarters. Since
this question only makes sense for rms that are part of a larger group, the analysis
is restricted to this sub-sample (of 1,258 establishments). Second, there is a question
related to delayering, which indicates whether there was any reduction in the number
of hierarchical layers between 1996 and 1998. Although, a priori, delayering may be
associated with more or less delegation (for example, because it may make the chief
executive more informed about lower layers), existing evidence shows that delayering
tends to involve delegating more power to lower layers of the managerial hierarchy (see
Caroli and Van Reenen [2001] and Rajan and Wulf [2006]).
Finally, we draw on a British dataset, the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey
(WERS), which is similar in structure to ER. WERS does not have a question on plant
managers' autonomy over investment decisions, but contains a question on their autonomy
from headquarters in making employment decisions. We use this question to measure the
degree of decentralization. Unlike with the French data, for condentiality reasons we
are not allowed to legally match WERS with productivity at the rm level, though we
can match productivity information at the four-digit industry level. Details on all three
datasets are in the Appendix B.
Our indicator of proximity to the frontier is the gap between the log labor productiv-
ity of a rm (measured as value-added per hour) and the frontier (log) labor productivity
in the primary four-digit industry of the rm, ln yilt   ln yFlt, where F denotes the fron-
tier, measured in a number of alternative ways. In addition to average labor productivity,
we report robustness checks using Total Factor Productivity (TFP). We also construct
several alternative indicators of \frontier" productivity. Our main measure is the highest
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productivity in the rm's primary four-digit industry (dened as the 99th percentile to
mitigate any measurement error from outliers that might arise had we used the maxi-
mum) again calculated from the FUTE dataset. We repeat the same exercise using other
percentiles (90th and 95th), and we consider alternative measures based on the rm's
productivity rank in the four-digit industry.
In addition to our main specication, we also allow ln yilt 1 and ln yFlt 1 to have
dierent coecients in the regression equation, by estimating
(5) dilt = Hilt 1 + 1 ln yilt 1 + 2 ln yFlt 1 + ageilt 1 +w
0
ilt 1 + uilt:
This specication allows us to test whether 2 < 0 (that is, whether, as predicted by
our theory, delegation is negatively correlated with lagged frontier productivity) and also
whether 1 =  2. This robustness check is particularly important, since a positive
correlation between distance to frontier and decentralization may reect a positive eect
of decentralization on the rm's own productivity. If this were the case, in equation (5)
we would estimate 2 = 0.
For heterogeneityHil; we use three measures. All three measures are constructed from
the FUTE dataset for the entire covered population of rms (in the United Kingdom we
use the ABI Census data). Our benchmark measure of heterogeneity, HGl , is the dispersion
of rm productivity growth within a four-digit sector. This measure captures the eect
of the parameter " in the model of Section III, since high values of " correspond to
greater heterogeneity in the performance of rms implementing the same technology, thus
to greater variability in productivity growth within a sector. We measure productivity
growth by the average annual growth in value added per hour over the 1994 to 1997
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period, and our main measure of dispersion is the dierence in productivity growth rates
between the 90th percentile and the 10th percentile in the four-digit industry. Thus we
have
(6) HGl  ( ln yil)90   ( ln yil)10;
where ( ln yil)
P denotes the P th percentile of the distribution of productivity growth
across all rms in industry l. We also consider several alternatives such as the dierence
between the 95th and the 5th percentiles (instead of the 90-10), the standard deviation
of rm productivity growth rates and the standard deviation of the trimmed productivity
growth distribution.
We also present results with an alternative measure of a heterogeneity, HLl , con-
structed similarly to HGl , but using productivity levels instead of growth rates (i.e.,
HLl  ln yil90   ln yil10). This measure has two empirical disadvantages relative to our
benchmark. First, it is likely to be correlated with the distance to the frontier, so the
heterogeneity and proximity terms may be hard to identify separately. Second, the growth-
based measure,HGl , is likely to be a better proxy for " since it dierences out time-invariant
omitted variables aecting the level of productivity that are observable to rms but not
the econometrician (such as management quality, brand dierences, etc.).
Both of these measures of heterogeneity do not vary within a four-digit industry. Our
third measure, HFi , is a rm-specic index of heterogeneity and quanties (the inverse of)
how many other rms are close \neighbors" of the rm in question in the product space.
When there are more similar rms (neighbors), the rm will have greater opportunity to
learn from the experiences of others and this will correspond to a lower value of " in terms
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of our theoretical model.17 To calculate this measure, for each rm i we compute the
distribution of production across all four-digit sectors. We dene si  (si1; : : : ; sil; : : : ; siL)
as rm i's shares of production in each industry l = 1; :::; L (by denition
PL
l=1 sil = 1).
An element of the vector si will be equal to zero if a rm produces nothing in industry l
and unity if a rm produces all its output in that particular industry. We then calculate
the \closeness" of any two rms, i and i0 in the FUTE as the uncentered correlation
coecient,
cii0 
PL
l=1 sil:si0lPL
l=1 s
2
il
 1
2
:
PL
l=1 s
2
i0l
 1
2
;
which takes greater values when the production proles of two rms are more similar and
is equal to unity when the two proles are identical. Since our theoretical approach em-
phasizes the importance of similarity in the context of experimenting with new technolo-
gies, our preferred measure of rm-specic heterogeneity is constructed with information
technology (IT) weights:
(7) HFi  log
 P
i0;i0 6=i cii0  ITi0P
i0;i0 6=i ITi0
! 1
;
where ITi0 is the level of investment in IT by rm i
0. We also check the robustness of our
results by looking at an alternative unweighted measure. The \inverse" in equation (7)
makes sure that high levels of HFi correspond to high values of " in terms of our theory.
An important concern with this rm-level heterogeneity measure is that it may be
related to the level of product market competition. If there are many other rms \close"
to a company in the product market space, then this company may be facing tougher com-
petition.18 To alleviate this concern, we control for various measures of product market
competition, in particular the Lerner index (a proxy for price-cost margins), calculated as
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gross prots|value added minus labor costs|divided by sales, from the FUTE dataset.
Moreover, we document below that there is a robust positive relationship between product
market competition and delegation, so the possible negative correlation between product
market competition and HFi will, if anything, bias the results towards nding a negative
eect of heterogeneity on delegation, which is the opposite of the prediction in Section
III.19
In addition, since our theory emphasizes the implementation of new technologies,
we estimate (3) and (5) separately in high-tech and low-tech subsamples (as measured
by industry IT intensity). We expect the patterns suggested by our model to be more
pronounced for high-tech rms.
To measure age, ageilt 1, we use four dummies; age less than 5 years, between 5 and
9 years, between 10 and 19 years, and the reference category, greater than or equal to 20
years.
Means, medians and standard deviations for all the main variables are presented in
Table 1. Appendix B gives greater detail on the data used. The average rm in our data
has 323 employees, was born 22 years ago and has 3 plants.
V. Results
A. Decentralization
Table 2 presents our basic ndings using the decentralization measure from COI.
Throughout, all regressions are estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) probit and we
report marginal eects evaluated at the sample mean. All standard errors are computed
using the Huber formula, where we allow for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the
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four-digit industry level. All regressions also include a full set of three-digit industry
dummies.20
The rst column includes only our key variables: heterogeneity (measured by the 90-
10 of rm productivity growth), frontier productivity (measured as the 99th percentile of
the productivity distribution in the rm's primary four-digit industry), own productivity,
age dummies and the three-digit industry dummies. The results are consistent with the
predictions in Section III|all key variables take their expected signs and are statistically
signicant at the 5% level. The marginal eects of heterogeneity and own productivity
are positive, whereas the marginal eects of frontier productivity and age are negative.21
Firms in more heterogeneous environments are signicantly more likely to be decentralized
(the marginal eect is 0.211, while the standard error is 0.107). The youngest rms (under
5 years old) are 15% more likely to be decentralized than the oldest rms (those over 20
years old) and this dierence is signicant at the 5% level. In column (2), we combine the
frontier productivity and the own productivity terms in a single \proximity to frontier"
term as in equation (3). The marginal eect of proximity to frontier is 0.167 (standard
error = 0.024), while the marginal eect of heterogeneity is 0.252 (standard error =
0.102).22 Overall, these patterns suggest that rms that are in more heterogeneous
environments and closer to the technology frontier of their industry are more likely to be
decentralized.23
The remaining columns in Table 2 include a large number of additional controls to
check whether the correlations we report are driven by omitted variables. These additional
covariates are: the Lerner index, a foreign ownership dummy, the log number of plants of
the rm, the (log of) capital stock divided by value added, log rm size, the fraction of
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employees working with computers, the fraction of high skilled workers, the average age
of workers, the rm's market share, a specialization/inverse diversication index, as well
as a number of industry-level variables, in particular, (the log of) capital stock divided
by employment, IT expenditures divided by employment and the Herndahl index. The
xed capital stock and computer use variables are included both as potential controls
and also to bring the measure of labor productivity closer to TFP by controlling for the
contribution of various components of the capital stock. Firm-level worker characteristics
are included since these may aect organizational choices; for example, rms with more
skilled workers and/or younger workers might be more likely to decentralize control. The
additional controls improve the t of the model, but the heterogeneity, age and produc-
tivity terms all remain individually signicant at the 5% level or less. Also notable is that
in the specication of column (3), which includes all the additional covariates, we do not
reject the hypothesis that 1 =  2, that is, the hypothesis that frontier and own labor
productivity terms have equal and opposite-signed coecients (p-value>0.10).
The estimated eects of these other variables are consistent with the existing liter-
ature. Firms that are more skill-intensive (Caroli and Van Reenen [2001]), that employ
younger workers (Aubert,Caroli and Muriel [2006]), that have more workers using com-
puters and/or that are more in more IT-intensive industries (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson
and Hitt [2002]) appear signicantly more likely to be decentralized. Furthermore, rms
that are large, multi-plant, foreign owned and/or less specialized (more diversied) are
also more likely to be decentralized, possibly because their production processes are more
complex. Firm-level capital stock or industry-level capital stock do not appear to have a
major eect on decentralization. There is also a robust negative relationship between the
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Lerner index, our (inverse) proxy for product market competition, and the probability of
decentralization, which implies that more concentrated industries are associated with less
decentralization. We discuss this association further in the concluding section.
Since the theory in Section III relates decentralization decisions to the adoption of new
technologies, we expect a stronger relationship between decentralization and heterogeneity
in the high-tech industries than in the low-tech sectors. We dene \high-tech" sectors
to be those with an average ratio of IT investment per worker greater than the sample
median and re-estimate the equations on these two sectors separately. Consistent with
our expectations, the marginal eects and signicance of all the key variables are greater
in the high-tech sectors than in the low-tech sectors. For example, the heterogeneity
index, HGl , is positive and signicant in the high-tech sectors (column (5)), but negative
and insignicant in the low-tech sectors (column (6)). The marginal eects of proximity
to frontier and of the youngest age dummy are twice as large in the high-tech sectors as
in the low-tech sectors. Wald tests show that these dierences are signicant at the 1%
level for heterogeneity and at the 5% level for proximity to frontier (but insignicantly
dierent for age).
Overall, the results in Table 2 suggest that, consistent with our theory and the rela-
tionships shown in Figures 1-3, rms that operate in more heterogeneous environments,
that are closer to the technology frontier, and that are younger are signicantly more
likely to be decentralized.
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B. Magnitudes
To gauge the quantitative magnitudes of the estimates in Table 2, we look at the
impact of doubling each variable starting from its sample mean.
Using the estimate of the marginal eect of heterogeneity in column (4) of Table
2, 0.251, we nd that doubling the mean value of heterogeneity (the 90-10 of rm pro-
ductivity growth in the industry) from 0.275 to 0.550 increases the predicted probability
of a rm being decentralized into prot centers by approximately 7 percentage points
(0:251  0:275  0:069) starting from a base of 30 percent, which is a sizeable eect.
Thus, in \elasticity" terms, a doubling of heterogeneity is associated with a 23% increase
in the probability of decentralization (a 6.9 percentage point increase on a base of 30
percent).24
Again using the estimate from column (4) of Table 2, doubling the proximity measure
leads to a substantial increase in the probability of decentralization of about 11 percentage
points which represents a 37% increase on the base of about 30 percent (0:164 ln 2=0:3).
Also using the estimates from column (4) of Table 2, doubling the age of a rm from four
years to eight years reduces the probability of decentralization by a third (11 percentage
points on a 30 percent base). These calculations suggest that the statistical associations
documented in Table 2 appear to be economically as well as statistically signicant.
C. Alternative measures of heterogeneity
Table 3 contrasts our basic measure of heterogeneity (the inter-decile range of rm
productivity growth rates in the industry) with several alternative indicators of hetero-
geneity. The rst column of Table 3 replicates the specication from the last column
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of Table 2 for comparison. The next three columns (2)-(4) use alternative measures of
heterogeneity, HGl still based on the dispersion of productivity growth rates across rms
within the four-digit industry. Column (2) shows a similar result to column (1) using the
dierence between the productivity growth rates at the 95th and 5th percentiles (instead
of the 90th and 10th percentiles). The marginal eect is 0.142 with a standard error of
0.069. In column (3) we use the standard deviation of the growth rate, which also has
a positive marginal eect, but is only signicant at the 10% level. This lack of precision
may be due to a number of outliers in the rm-level productivity growth distribution. In
column (4), we use the standard deviation calculated after trimming the top and bottom
5% of the rm-level productivity growth distribution and obtain a much larger and much
more signicant marginal eect.
Column (5) includes the heterogeneity term based on rm productivity levels, HLl .
The marginal eect of this variable is positive, but is not statistically signicant at the
5% level. The estimated magnitude is comparable to that in column (1), however; a
doubling of HLl is associated with a 27% increase in decentralization (a 8.1 percentage
point increase on a base of 30 percent) compared to 23% for our benchmark measure,
HGl . Furthermore, as with our benchmark results in Table 2, the level-based measure
of heterogeneity, HLl , has a large and statistically signicant marginal eect of 0.271 in
the high-tech sample (column (6)). In contrast, its marginal eect is insignicant (and
negative) in the low-tech sample (column (7)) and is also signicantly dierent from the
estimate in the high-tech sample (p-value=0.009).
Columns (8)-(11) report results using the rm-level measure of heterogeneity, HFi .
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Recall that this index measure is the (inverse) IT-weighted distance of a rm to all other
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rms. This is an entirely dierent source of variation in heterogeneity and thus constitutes
a useful cross-validation of the main results. In column (8) of Table 3 HFi has a marginal
eect of 0.063 and a standard error of 0.031. The next two columns show that, as with the
other measures, the eect of heterogeneity is stronger in the high-tech subsample than
among the low-tech industries (0.098 with a standard error of 0.048 versus 0.019 with
a standard error of 0.037). Finally, in column (11) we look at the simpler unweighted
measure of the rm-level heterogeneity measure. This is also useful as another check to
see whether this measure is capturing some competition-related factors. If that were the
case, we would expect the unweighted measure to be stronger. The unweighted measure
also has a positive eect, but with a smaller coecient that is only statistically signicant
at the 10% level. This suggests that, consistent with our theoretical approach, the IT
weights increase the explanatory power of the rm-level heterogeneity index.26
Overall, the results in this table show that there is a robust positive association
between heterogeneity and decentralization, particularly in high-tech industries.27
D. Further robustness checks
In addition, we conducted a large number of robustness checks (see Acemoglu et
al, 2006, and Appendix B for details). These checks show that our main results do not
depend on the precise functional form, control variables or the exact sample.
First, estimating the marginal eects by OLS or logit gave very similar marginal
eects to the probit baseline of column (3) Table 2.
Second, alternative measures of productivity and distance the frontier also gave sim-
ilar results. For example, results using total factor productivity were very close to those
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using labor productivity. We also experimented with alternative denitions of the dis-
tance to frontier using an ordinal measure (the rank of the rm's labor productivity in
the four-digit industry) or lower percentiles of the productivity distribution to the 99th
percentile in order to measure the frontier (e.g., the 95th and the 90th). Again, the results
were qualitatively similar, but the marginal eects of the frontier became progressively
weaker as we used the 95th and the 90th percentiles. This pattern is not surprising, since
we expect 95th and 90th percentiles to be are poorer measures of the technology frontier
than the 99th percentile.
Third, although a single rm can be organized into divisions with each division being
decentralized as a prot center, the measure of prot centers may be more natural for
rms that are part of larger groups. To investigate this issue further and also to exclude
potentially owner-managed rms, we re-estimated our basic specication on the sub-
sample of 1,793 rms that are part of a larger corporate group. Reassuringly, the eects
of heterogeneity and proximity to frontier are now considerably larger and more signicant
(0.461 with a standard error of 0.140 for heterogeneity and -0.303 with a standard error
of 0.056 for the frontier).
Another concern is that we have allocated a single \frontier" to each rm, whereas
rms that operate across multiple industries will have multiple \frontiers". To address
this concern, we limited the sample to rms that have at least 80% of their sales in
their primary four-digit industry, since the multiple industry issue should not be a serious
concern for these rms. In this limited sample of 2,555 rms, both heterogeneity and the
frontier terms remain highly signicant, but the marginal eect of the frontier term is
somewhat smaller; -0.179 instead of -0.225 in the baseline specication.
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We also estimated instrumental-variable models to address the issue of endogeneity
of our main right-hand side variables. Our strategy was to use the UK counterparts of our
variables as instruments. Although this approach does not solve all possible endogeneity
problems, it is a useful check against reverse causality concerns. We constructed hetero-
geneity variables identical to HGl based on the dispersion of productivity growth among
British rms for the same time period to instrument French industry-level heterogeneity.
We also constructed the 99th percentile of the productivity distribution in each four-digit
British industry as a potential instrument for the French proximity to frontier. The details
are provided in Acemoglu et al. [2006]. Briey, these instruments are highly signicant in
the rst stages. Using instrumental-variables probit (see Lee [1981]), we estimated positive
and signicant eects of both heterogeneity and proximity to frontier in the second stage.
The marginal eects in this case are 1.572 for heterogeneity and 0.456 for the proximity to
frontier (compared to 0.230 and 0.167 when treating these variables as exogenous). These
instrumental-variable results therefore suggest that, if anything, treating heterogeneity
and proximity as exogenous may be causing some attenuation due to measurement error
and making us underestimate the impact of heterogeneity and proximity to the frontier
on decentralization.
E. Alternative measures of decentralization
Two alternative measures of decentralization are control over investment decisions
and delayering. Whether an establishment's senior managers can make investment deci-
sions without consulting headquarters is clearly directly related to delegation of authority.
Case studies and econometric evidence suggest that reducing the layers of the manage-
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rial hierarchy tends to be associated with decentralized decision making.28 There are
questions on delayering and the autonomy of investment decision making in our second
French dataset, the Enque^te Reponse (ER).29 Delayering is dened as the removal of
one or more layers of the managerial hierarchy between 1996 and 1998. We dened our
indicator of investment autonomy/decentralization to be equal to unity if the plant man-
ager had \full" or \important" authority in making investment decisions independently
of central headquarters and zero if she had \limited" or \no" autonomy in making such
decisions.
Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (5) for these alternative measures
both for the full sample and also separately for the high-tech and the low-tech sub-
samples (constructed using industry IT intensity as in Table 2). In addition, we limit
the sample to rms that are part of a larger group, because the question on delegation
of investment decisions from headquarters is only relevant for these rms. In columns
(1)-(3) the dependent variable is an indicator of whether the rm allows autonomy over
investment decisions to its plant managers. In columns (4)-(9), the dependent variable is
an indicator for whether there was a reduction in the number of layers in the managerial
hierarchy between 1996 and 1998.
In column (1) of Table 4 frontier productivity is negatively and signicantly related
to the probability of allowing managers to make investment decisions without consulting
headquarters (decentralization). Heterogeneity is positively related to decentralization,
but (like age) is insignicant. When we distinguish between high-tech (column (2)) and
low-tech sectors (column (3)), the results are stronger. In the high-tech sectors, the
marginal eect of heterogeneity is positive and signicant at 5%, whereas in the low-tech
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sectors it is insignicant. Similarly, the marginal eect of proximity to the frontier is neg-
atively and signicantly related to decentralization in the high-tech sample, but is positive
and insignicant in the low-tech sample. Own productivity and age are insignicant in
both subsamples.
The next six columns use the measure of delayering as the dependent variable. In
column (4) the productivity terms are both correctly signed and signicant at the 5%
level, suggesting that the closer is a rm to the technology frontier the more likely it
is to choose delayering. Younger rms are signicantly more likely to delayer than older
rms.30 The heterogeneity term is positive and signicant at the 10% level. When we split
the sample into high-tech (column (5)) and low-tech (column (6)) sectors, the marginal
eects of heterogeneity and proximity are again much larger in the high-tech sectors than
in the low-tech sectors, but the standard errors are also much larger in both samples. In
contrast, the age eects are larger in the low-tech sample, which is the opposite of the
prediction of our theory.
Since the delayering variable measures \organizational change" (rather than the
\level" of decentralization as in our previous dependent variable), we also considered
regressions where the productivity terms are in dierences rather than in levels. Since we
do not have reliable time-series information on the heterogeneity term and some of the
other covariates, they are still included in levels. The results, presented in columns (7)-
(9), are similar to the benchmark estimates, but somewhat weaker. The frontier growth
term is correctly signed, but no longer signicant and the own productivity term is also
insignicant.31 The heterogeneity measure remains positive and signicant in the full
sample. With the sample split, it is no longer signicant in either sample (presumably
31
because of the smaller number of observations), though, as expected, the marginal eect
is substantially larger in the high-tech sample.
In summary, the results from using delayering and autonomy over investment deci-
sions as alternative indicators of decentralization broadly support our earlier conclusions.
Decentralization appears to be more likely when the environment is more heterogeneous
and rms are closer to the technology frontier, particularly in high-tech sectors, though
the age results appear to be somewhat less robust.
F. Decentralization in Britain
We complement our evidence from the French micro datasets with an analysis of the
British Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98). The French Enque^te Reponse
was modeled on WERS and we use the 1998 wave to match the year used in ER. The
WERS cross-section does not have a question on autonomy over investment decisions, but
there is a similar question on the establishment manager's autonomy over employment
decisions. Senior managers were asked whether they were able to take decisions on sta
recruiting without consulting company headquarters. Our WERS sample is further re-
stricted because we are only able to match manufacturing establishments to industry-level
information (unfortunately census information on non-manufacturing is not available over
this time period). Finally, we are unable to condition on the rich set of rm level covari-
ates as in the French data, because condentiality restrictions limit the data that can be
matched at the rm level (such as rm-level output, capital or age).
The results are presented in Table 5. Column (1) includes the rst measure of hetero-
geneity (the dierence between the 95th percentile and the 5th percentile of the produc-
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tivity growth rates in the four-digit industry) with only a full set of three-digit industry
dummies as extra controls. Heterogeneity is positively and signicantly associated with
decentralization at the 5% level. The next column performs the same exercise for the 90-
10, the relationship is still positive and signicant at the 10% level. Column (3) includes
the frontier growth term which is negatively signed as we would expect from the theory,
but insignicant. The fourth column includes the age dummies. These are insignicant
and show no clear pattern (possibly because in this dataset we only have establishment
age rather than rm age).
The fth and sixth columns include all the covariates. There appears to be some
evidence that rms facing less competition are signicantly less likely to decentralize.
More importantly, the heterogeneity terms measured either as the 90-10 (column (5)) or
the 95-5 (column (6)) percentile dierences remain positive and signicant. The frontier
term enters negatively in the regressions in both columns and is signicant at the 5% level.
Both of these ndings are consistent with our theory and with the results we presented
from the French datasets, even though they are taken from a dierent dataset from a
dierent country.
VI. Conclusions
Despite considerable academic and popular interest in the changes in the internal
organization of the rm, we are far from a theoretical or an empirical consensus on the
determinants of the organizational decisions of rms and on the reasons why there has re-
cently been a signicant move towards greater decentralization. In this paper we presented
a simple model of the relationship between technology, information and decentralization
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and empirically investigated the main predictions of this model using three micro-level
datasets. In our model, rms delegate authority to managers, i.e., \decentralize", in
order to use the manager's superior information about the implementation of new tech-
nologies. Because the interests of the manager and the principal are not perfectly aligned,
such delegation entails a costly loss of control for the principal. The model predicts that
as available public information about the implementation of new technologies increases,
rms should become less likely to decentralize, whereas rms dealing with new (frontier)
technologies should be more likely to decentralize. We also showed that rms in more
heterogeneous environments and young rms are more likely to choose decentralization.
These are intuitive, but quite novel, predictions, and have, to the best of our knowledge,
never been investigated empirically.
We documented that in all three datasets the correlations are broadly consistent
with the predictions of our model. Firms in more heterogeneous environments and those
that are closer to the frontier of their industry are more likely to choose decentraliza-
tion. Moreover, consistent with the predictions of the theory, these results are stronger
for rms in high-tech sectors. The results are robust to using a variety of alternative
measures of decentralization and heterogeneity. We also found that younger rms tended
to be more likely to decentralize, though this result was less robust when we looked at
alternative measures of decentralization. These results suggest that the recent move to-
wards more decentralized organizations may be driven, in part, by the rapid diusion of
new technologies and the entry of young rms.
The theory and empirical results taken together suggest that learning and information
accumulation may have important eects on the internal organization of rms and may be
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especially important for decentralization decisions. Our analysis also highlights a number
of avenues for future research. First, the same forces pushing towards decentralization may
also encourage spinos and reduce the incentives for vertical integration. An important
area for future research is to study vertical integration and decentralization decisions
jointly.
Second, our empirical results showed a robust positive association of competition and
decentralization. An interesting question is to investigate the channels through which
competition may aect decentralization. One possibility is that competition may increase
the value of information, because falling behind competitors may be costly to rms,
thus encouraging delegation to the manager who has superior information. Yet another
eect of a more competitive environment may be through disciplining the manager; faced
with greater competition, managers may be forced to take prot-maximizing decisions
more often, thus reducing the conict of interest between the principal and the manager.
This would naturally increase delegation, since delegation becomes more attractive to the
principal.
Another interesting area of future research is to investigate whether the statistical as-
sociations between proximity to frontier or heterogeneity and decentralization correspond
to the causal eects of these variables on the internal organization of the rm. Specifying
and estimating a more structural model would be a fruitful approach for this purpose.
Finally, our approach suggests a natural reason for cross-country dierences in the in-
ternal organization of rms; we may expect less decentralization in developing countries
where most rms use well-established (rather than frontier) technologies. Theoretical and
empirical analysis of cross-country patterns of organizational forms is another promising
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area for future research.
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1. Throughout the paper the principal could be thought of as either the owner or
the chief operating ocer of the rm.
2. See, among others, Sah, and Stiglitz [1986], Geanakoplos and Milgrom [1991], Rad-
ner and Van Zandt [1992], Radner [1993], Bolton and Dewatripont [1994], and Garicano
[2000].
3. The possibility that the implementation of new technologies could encourage
delegation was rst raised by Jensen and Meckling [1992]. Aghion and Tirole [1997]
emphasize the trade-o between loss of control and the agent's ex ante incentives to
acquire information under decentralization. Hart and Moore [2005] show how the trade-o
between loss of control and information can explain why in many hierarchies generalists
command specialists. Dessein [2002] develops a model in which decentralization to a
specialized agent entails a loss of control for the principal, but at the same time reduces
the agent's incentive to miscommunicate her information to the principal.
4. Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1999] present a dierent model where endogenous accu-
mulation of information aects the internal organization of rms. In their model, a larger
number of rms in the economy enables better relative performance of evaluation and
creates a shift from direct to indirect monitoring. The number of rms in the economy is,
in turn, determined endogenously as a function of the stage of development and the level
of the capital stock.
5. This phenomenon is described by dierent terms in dierent contexts, including
decentralization, delayering and delegation. In the theory, consistent with the principal-
agent literature, we use the term \delegation", while in the empirical analysis, we adopt
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the terms used in the datasets, namely \decentralization" in the rst dataset and \delay-
ering" in the second.
6. http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/index.htm?prof id=acemoglu&type=paper.
7. This implies that

xi;k
	
i
is a Bernoulli sequence with a parameter of 1   " or "
(depending on whether xk = L or R).
8. Put dierently, in this model the choice between centralization and delegation
simply corresponds to whether or not the \advice" of the manager is followed by the
principal. In particular, all the results would be identical if we considered a dierent game
form in which the manager reports his recommendation and then the principal decides
which action to take. In this alternative game form, \delegation" would correspond to the
principal following the recommendation of the manager. See Acemoglu et al. [2006] and
Appendix A for the results in the case where the principal can use incentive contracts.
9. Note that ~nik is equal to the number of rms that have adopted technology k
before i; chose xi0;k = L and were successful, plus the number of rms that chose xi0;k = R
and were unsuccessful. The public information set also includes the organizational form
chosen by rms that have previously adopted technology k, but equation (2) implies that
~nik is a sucient statistic for this public information.
10. The statements here and in Proposition 1 show that as nik ! 1,  (0;hik) will
increase towards 1 ". One might also conjecture that  (0;hik) and hence the probability
of centralization should be monotonically increasing in nik. In Acemoglu et al. [2006], we
show that when nik is low, integer issues may cause  (0;h
i
k) to be nonmonotonic, but it
is increasing in nik \on average," i.e., when we average over neighboring values of n
i
k to
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smooth out integer issues.
11. Although in this section we state the results in terms of \distance to the technol-
ogy frontier," in the empirical work it will be more convenient to use the inverse of this,
\proximity to the frontier".
12. Interestingly, this applies to both \correct" and \incorrect" beliefs. For instance,
suppose that xk = L, but R has been successful more than half of the time; when " is
small, the rm will assign higher probability to R being the correct action.
13. For previous uses of this dataset, see Greenan and Mairesse [1999], Janod [2002],
Aubert, Caroli, and Roger [2004], Crepon, Heckel, and Riedinger [2004], and Janod and
Saint-Martin [2004].
14. FUTE also contains the population of non-manufacturing rms with more than 10
employees. These data are not published in the French National Accounts, so we worked
directly with the underlying micro data located in the French statistical agencies in order
to construct the appropriate variables. Similarly the information on the demographic
structure of each rm (skills, worker age, hours, gender, etc.) had to be built up from the
employee level datasources aggregated to the rm level. See Appendix B for details.
15. For the meaning of the terms responsibility centers and prot centers in the busi-
ness literature and in management, see, for example: http://smccd.net/accounts/nurre/online/chtr12a.htm.
In addition, http://www.aloa.co.uk/members/downloads/PDF%20Output/costcentres.pdf,
provides a standard discussion of autonomy of prot centers. Janod [2002] and Janod and
Saint-Martin [2004] have previously used these data on prot centers as a measure of de-
centralization.
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16. Merchant's [1989, p. 10] book on prot centers explains: \The prot center
managers frequently know their business better than top management does because they
can devote much more of their time to following up developments in their specialized
areas. Hence, top level managers usually do not have detailed knowledge of the actions
they want particular prot center managers to take, and even direct monitoring of the
actions taken, if it were feasible would not ensure prot center managers were acting
appropriately."
17. This measure of closeness is inspired by Jae's [1986] approach in the context
of patent spillovers, but uses the proportion of production in a four-digit industry. Jae
originally used patent technology class, which has the potential disadvantage that many
rms do not patent, especially in service sectors.
18. See Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen [2004] for discussion.
19. See Nickell, Nicolitsas, and Patterson [2001] and McKinsey Global Institute
[2002].
20. Since the frontier productivity term and the heterogeneity measure HGl are
dened at the four-digit level, we could not identify their eects if we included four-digit
industry dummies. Instead, with a full set of four-digit dummies, we can only identify
the marginal eects of age and rm-specic productivity. These remain correctly signed
and signicant at conventional levels with a full set of four digit dummies.
21. When included individually each variable is also signicant. For example, when
we drop all other variables except the industry dummies, the marginal eect of hetero-
geneity is -0.212, which is signicant at the 5% level (see Acemoglu et al. [2006] for
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details).
22. The Wald test rejects the restriction that 1 =  2 at the 5% level, though
when additional covariates are included in columns (3) and (4), this restriction is no
longer rejected.
23. Since our main models are cross-sectional, we cannot distinguish age and cohort
eects. Consequently the positive coecient on age may be driven by rms founded in
more recent years being more likely to adopt \best practice" organizational forms (see,
e.g., Ichinowski, Prenushi and Shaw [1997]).
24. A one standard deviation increase in heterogeneity (0.087) results in a smaller
increase in decentralization probabilities: a 2.2 percentage point, or 7.3% increase.
25. All of the results in Table 2 are similar if we use this measure. For example, the
most parsimonious specication in column (1) of Table 2 gives a marginal eect of HFi of
0.112 with a standard error of 0.034.
26. If we include both the weighted and the unweighted measures together with
all covariates, the weighted measure is positive and signicant at the 5% level (marginal
eect=0.184, standard error=0.096), while the unweighted measure is negative (marginal
eect=-0.142, standard error=0.109).
27. One concern with any measure of heterogeneity is that, since it is correlated with
uncertainty in rm's environment, it may aect the extent of the moral hazard problem
between the rm and the manager (an issue we have abstracted from in the model).
Nevertheless, everything else equal, this eect would bias the results against nding a
positive association between heterogeneity and decentralization, since greater uncertainty
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should increase agency costs, making decentralization less attractive.
28. See, for example, Caroli, and Van Reenen [2001] and Rajan and Wulf [2006].
29. In the COI dataset there is an indicator of the number of hierarchical levels, but
as discussed in Appendix B, a better datasource to measure delayering is the ER. Briey,
this is because the Enque^te Reponse question on delayering refers explicitly to changes
in management, which is more in line with the theory. The COI question, by contrast,
refers to the number of \hierarchical levels" and is thus likely to be more informative on
hierarchies involving production workers.
30. Although the ER data is at the establishment level, the regressions in Table 4
use rm age to make the results comparable to those in Tables 2 and 3. The young rm
dummy remains positive and signicant if we also condition on establishment age.
31. The weakness of the frontier growth term in this case is related to the higher corre-
lation between productivity growth and heterogeneity variables (recall that heterogeneity
is dened here as the decile ratio of productivity growth rates in the rm's four-digit
industry). In column (7) if we drop the heterogeneity and rm productivity terms, the
marginal eect of frontier productivity growth increases to -0.064 with a standard error of
0.031. If we use the full specication of column (7), but just include two-digit (instead of
the usual three-digit) industry dummies, the marginal eect of frontier growth becomes
-0.074 with a standard error of 0.038.
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Heterogeneity and Decentralization
NOTES: The X-axis divides all firms into deciles of heterogeneity from the first decile (low heterogeneity) to the tenth
decile (high heterogeneity). Heterogeneity is measured by an index of dispersion (the difference of the 90thminus the 10th
percentile) of productivity growth between firms in a four digit industry (see text). The Y-axis indicates the proportion of
firms that are decentralized into profit centers in the relevant decile group. The sample is the COI sample (3,570 French
firms in 1997).
Figure II
0
10
20
30
40
%
 F
irm
s d
ec
en
tra
liz
ed
 in
to
 P
ro
fit 
Ce
nt
er
s
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
-proximity increases
Proximity to Frontier and Decentralization
NOTES: The X-axis divides all firms into deciles of proximity to frontier (in terms of value added per hour) from the first
decile (low proximity to frontier) to the tenth decile (high proximity to frontier). The Y-axis indicates the proportion of
firms that are decentralized into profit centers in the relevant decile group. The sample is the COI sample (3,570 French
firms in 1997).
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Firm Age and Decentralization
NOTES: Firms are grouped into age bands (dated from the birth of the firm). The Y-axis indicates the proportion of
firms that are decentralized into profit centers in the relevant age group. The sample is the COI sample (3,570 French
firms in 1997).
49
Table I
Descriptive Statistics
(Enqueˆte COI, 1994-1997)
Variable Source Mean Median St dev
Decentralization measures
Organized into profit centers COI 0.304 0 0.460
Decentralization of investment decisions ER 0.484 0 0.500
Delayering ER 0.436 0 0.496
Heterogeneity measures: Industry level heterogeneity of labour productivity growth (HG
l
)
90th − 10th percentiles DADS/FUTE 0.275 0.263 0.087
95th − 5th percentiles DADS/FUTE 0.443 0.406 0.160
Standard deviation DADS/FUTE 0.177 0.165 0.066
Standard deviation after trimming DADS/FUTE 0.088 0.082 0.033
Heterogeneity measures: Industry level heterogeneity of labour productivity level (HL
l
)
90th − 10th percentiles DADS/FUTE 0.897 0.861 0.229
Heterogeneity measure: Firm level inverse share of close firms in the product space (HF
i
)
Share of close (IT weighted) firms, % FUTE 0.343 0.138 0.049
ln (Firm specific heterogeneity) 7.111 6.587 2.381
Share of close (unweighted) firms, % FUTE 0.216 0.096 0.308
Distance to technological frontier
Firm labour productivity DADS/FUTE 0.163 0.143 0.089
Sectoral 99th perc. labour productivity DADS/FUTE 0.508 0.397 0.315
Proximity to frontier DADS/FUTE 0.358 0.334 0.159
ln (Proximity to frontier) -1.125 -1.096 0.457
Other firm level variables
Foreign ownership LIFI 0.173 0 0.379
Firms belonging to a larger group LIFI 0.547 1 0.498
Number of plants DADS 3.092 1 8.510
Firm age SIRENE 21.658 18 12.740
Capital stock/value added FUTE 1.143 0.907 1.036
Number of workers FUTE 323.463 88.375 677.080
Percentage of workers using computers COI 59.669 71.846 26.300
Percentage of skilled workers DADS 72.996 77.371 20.202
Age of workers DADS 38.870 39.010 3.403
Lerner index FUTE 0.075 0.068 0.077
Market share (%) FUTE 1.732 0.404 4.171
Herfindahl index FUTE 0.049 0.031 0.057
Specialization FUTE 0.831 0.931 0.203
Other industry level variables
Capital stock per worker) BRN 404.987 289.242 369.064
IT investment (per worker) EAE/FUTE 0.849 0.600 0.725
NOTES: These descriptive statistics are based on the COI sample (3,570 observations), except for “Decentralization of
investment decisions” and “Delayering” (ER sample: 1,258 observations). The COI dataset is a firm level survey providing
information on organization and other firm characteristics in 1997; it covers manufacturing sectors only. The ER dataset
is an establishment survey containing information about organizational change between 1996 and 1998; it covers both
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. The FUTE files contain the firms balance sheet and further accounting
information; it refers to the entire population of French firms having more than 20 employees in manufacturing industries
and more than 10 employees in other industries. The DADS files consist of yearly mandatory employer reports of each
worker’s hours (and gross earnings subject to payroll taxes); they cover the entire population of French firms. The LIFI
files describe the structure of ownership of large French firms; it also includes information about their main interests in
other companies. SIRENE is the register of all French firms. Units of currency are thousands of French Francs at the
1995 prices. See text for variable definitions.
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Table II
Determinants of Decentralization
(Enqueˆte COI)
Dependent variable Firm decentralized into Profit Centers
Industries Full sample High-tech Low-tech
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Heterogeneity (HG
l
) 0.211 0.252 0.296 0.251 0.679 -0.062
(0.107) (0.102) (0.127) (0.115) (0.189) (0.135)
Frontier, 99th percentile -0.101 - -0.225 - - -
(ln yFl) (0.039) (0.045)
Labour productivity, firm level 0.182 - 0.141 - - -
(ln yil) (0.026) (0.033)
Proximity to frontier - 0.167 - 0.164 0.224 0.103
(constrained term ln yil − ln yFl) (0.024) (0.028) (0.040) (0.044)
Firm age<5 years 0.151 0.151 0.172 0.174 0.215 0.122
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.059) (0.055)
5≤ Firm age<10 years 0.012 0.012 0.066 0.066 0.069 0.049
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.029)
10≤Firm age<20 years -0.007 -0.007 0.039 0.040 -0.008 0.083
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.028)
Other firm and industry no no yes yes yes yes
controls (cont.)
Industry dummies yes (73) yes (73) yes (73) yes (73) yes (52) yes (42)
Mean of dependent variable 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.378 0.232
Observations 3,570 3,570 3,570 3,570 1,767 1,803
NOTES: All coefficients are marginal effects from probit maximum likelihood estimation. Robust standard errors corrected for arbitrary variance-covariance matrix at
the four-digit industry level in parentheses. Industry variables are defined at the four-digit level (except industry dummies at the three-digit level). All right hand side
variables are lagged and averaged over three years (1994-1997). Labor productivity is the log of value added per hour, frontier is defined as the 99th percentile of the
productivity distribution in the firm’s four-digit industry. Heterogeneity is defined as the dispersion of productivity growth rate within a four digit industry (the 90th
percentile less the 10th percentile). The omitted category for firm age is “firm age greater than twenty years”. High-tech subsample includes all firms in industries with
greater than median IT investment per worker. Low-tech subsample includes all firms in industries with less than median IT investment per worker. See text for variable
definitions.
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Table II (-cont.)
Determinants of Decentralization
(Enqueˆte COI)
Dependent variable Firm decentralized into Profit Centers
Industries Full sample High-tech Low-tech
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lerner index - - -0.660 -0.733 -0.947 -0.547
(0.144) (0.136) (0.168) (0.218)
ln (Number of plants) - - 0.041 0.041 0.027 0.052
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.017)
ln (Firm size) - - 0.110 0.110 0.134 0.098
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.014)
Percentage of workers using computers - - 0.220 0.217 0.238 0.189
(0.034) (0.034) (0.071) (0.034)
Percentage of skilled workers - - 0.169 0.153 0.206 0.090
(0.049) (0.048) (0.078) (0.059)
ln (Firm capital/value added) - - 0.008 0.009 -0.003 0.022
(0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016)
Foreign ownership - - 0.047 0.045 0.064 0.015
(0.025) (0.025) (0.038) (0.032)
Average age of workers in the firm (/10) - - -0.057 -0.060 -0.155 0.008
(0.025) (0.025) (0.046) (0.027)
Firm market share - - -0.577 -0.574 -0.821 -0.520
(0.260) (0.257) (0.382) (0.419)
ln (Firm specialization) - - -0.071 -0.070 -0.119 -0.027
(0.030) (0.030) (0.047) (0.039)
ln (Herfindahl index) - - -0.015 -0.011 0.031 -0.024
(0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.022)
ln (Sector capital stock per worker) - - -0.064 -0.074 -0.115 -0.033
(0.040) (0.040) (0.035) (0.043)
ln (Sector IT investment per worker) - - 0.116 0.102 0.059 0.111
(0.019) (0.019) (0.044) (0.029)
Industry dummies yes (73) yes (73) yes (73) yes (73) yes (52) yes (42)
Mean of dependent variable 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.378 0.232
Observations 3,570 3,570 3,570 3,570 1,767 1,803
5
2
Table III
Determinants of Decentralization: Alternative Measures of Heterogeneity
(Enqueˆte COI)
Dependent variable Firm decentralized into Profit Centers
(mean=0.304)
Heterogeneity: dispersion of Heterogeneity: dispersion of Heterogeneity: ln of the inverse
Measure of heterogeneity productivity growth productivity levels share of “close” firms
in four-digit industry (HG
l
) in four-digit industry (HL
l
) in the product space (/10, HF
i
)
90th 95th Standard Std dev Un-
−10th −5th deviation after 90th − 10th percentiles IT weighted weighted
percentiles percentiles trimming
Industry Full sample Full High- Low- Full High- Low- Full
sample tech tech sample tech tech sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Heterogeneity 0.251 0.142 0.231 0.870 0.090 0.271 -0.064 0.063 0.098 0.019 0.055
(0.115) (0.069) (0.132) (0.316) (0.062) (0.092) (0.090) (0.031) (0.048) (0.037) (0.035)
Proximity to frontier 0.164 0.168 0.152 0.165 0.153 0.222 0.100 0.159 0.208 0.104 0.146
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.041) (0.044) (0.028) (0.039) (0.043) (0.027)
Firm age<5 years 0.174 0.173 0.171 0.173 0.171 0.211 0.121 0.177 0.214 0.123 0.173
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.059) (0.056) (0.041) (0.060) (0.056) (0.041)
5≤ Firm age<10 years 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.066 0.068 0.067 0.049 0.067 0.068 0.049 0.067
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.029) (0.022) (0.032) (0.029) (0.022)
10≤Firm age<20 years 0.040 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.039 -0.009 0.083 0.041 -0.005 0.082 0.040
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.028) (0.019) (0.027) (0.028) (0.019)
Lerner index -0.733 -0.750 -0.708 -0.743 -0.725 -0.952 -0.534 -0.721 -0.895 -0.544 -0.697
(0.136) (0.137) (0.134) (0.136) (0.132) (0.172) (0.217) (0.136) (0.168) (0.218) (0.133)
Industry dummies yes (73) yes (73) yes (73) yes (73) yes (73) yes (52) yes (42) yes (73) yes (52) yes (42) yes (73)
Observations 3,570 3,570 3,570 3,570 3,570 1,767 1,803 3,570 1,767 1,803 3,570
NOTES: All coefficients are marginal effects from probit maximum likelihood estimation. Robust standard errors corrected for arbitrary variance-covariance matrix at
the four-digit industry level in parentheses. In column (1) the measure of heterogeneity is the difference between the productivity growth rate for the firm at the 90th
percentile less the 10th percentile; in column (2) it is the 95th percentile less the 5th percentile; in column (3) it is the standard deviation of productivity growth rates
and in column (4) it is the same as column (2) except we trim the bottom and top 5% of productivity growth distribution in each four-digit industry. In columns (5) to
(7) the measure of heterogeneity is the difference between the productivity level for the firm at the 90th percentile less the 10th percentile. In columns (8) to (10), the
heterogeneity measure is the log of the inverse of the share of IT weighted “close” firms in the product space; whereas in column (11) these firms are not IT weighted.
Full set of firm and industry level controls included as in Table II column (4); see text for variable definitions.
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Table IV
Determinants of Decentralization: Alternative Measures of Decentralization
(Enqueˆte Reponse)
Dependent variable Decentralization of Some delayering between 1996 and 1998
investment decisions, 1998
Specification of proximity
to frontier Level Level Growth rate
Industries Full High - Low- Full High - Low- Full High - Low-
sample tech tech sample tech tech sample tech tech
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Heterogeneity (HG
l
) 0.108 0.455 -0.127 0.355 0.398 0.075 0.434 0.396 0.102
(0.165) (0.235) (0.415) (0.185) (0.283) (0.301) (0.200) (0.304) (0.294)
Frontier (99th percentile) -0.110 -0.249 0.021 -0.115 -0.152 0.011 -0.058 -0.078 -0.043
(0.054) (0.079) (0.103) (0.051) (0.080) (0.086) (0.048) (0.064) (0.067)
Labour productivity (firm) 0.072 0.064 0.104 0.126 0.118 0.066 -0.056 0.164 -0.137
(0.052) (0.077) (0.075) (0.056) (0.072) (0.081) (0.101) (0.157) (0.109)
Firm age<5 years -0.036 -0.016 -0.027 0.183 0.099 0.275 0.054 0.102 0.017
(0.056) (0.080) (0.092) (0.088) (0.113) (0.129) (0.107) (0.171) (0.114)
5≤Firm age<10 years -0.007 -0.044 0.022 0.047 -0.007 0.076 0.034 -0.031 0.095
(0.048) (0.074) (0.061) (0.056) (0.064) (0.084) (0.059) (0.068) (0.090)
10≤Firm age<20 years 0.004 -0.015 0.026 0.069 0.059 0.068 0.072 0.056 0.099
(0.040) (0.059) (0.054) (0.039) (0.054) (0.055) (0.040) (0.053) (0.054)
Lerner index -0.034 -0.046 -0.029 -0.934 -0.166 -0.981 -0.666 0.048 -0.977
(0.009) (0.024) (0.114) (0.288) (0.416) (0.402) (0.257) (0.358) (0.359)
Industry dummies yes (81) yes (49) yes (31) yes (70) yes (47) yes (43) yes (69) yes (47) yes (42)
Mean of dependent variable 0.484 0.475 0.493 0.440 0.553 0.325 0.436 0.553 0.320
Observations 1,258 648 610 1,049 526 523 1,011 505 501
NOTES: All coefficients are marginal effects from probit maximum likelihood estimation. Robust standard errors corrected for arbitrary variance-covariance matrix at
the four-digit industry level in parentheses. All establishments are part of a large (French or foreign) group but are not Head Quarters. Heterogeneity is defined as the
dispersion of productivity growth rates within a four digit industry (the 90th percentile less the 10th percentile). Full set of firm and industry level controls included as
in Table II column (4); see text for variable definitions.
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Table V
Determinants of Decentralization in Britain
(British WERS98)
Dependent variable Decentralization of employment decisions
(mean=0.805)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Heterogeneity (HG
l
) 0.273 - - - 0.316 -
(95th − 5th percentiles) (0.130) (0.129)
Heterogeneity (HG
l
) - 0.540 - - - 0.659
(90th − 10th percentiles) (0.325) (0.312)
Frontier - - -0.051 - -0.204 -0.156
(99th percentile) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Establishment age<5 years - - - -0.076 -0.099 -0.123
(0.115) (0.116) (0.114)
5≤Est. age<10 years - - - 0.086 0.055 0.049
(0.081) (0.089) (0.089)
10≤Est. age<20 years - - - -0.127 -0.164 -0.173
(0.077) (0.076) (0.075)
Many competitors - - - - 0.127 0.150
(0.082) (0.078)
Few competitors - - - - 0.210 0.228
(0.070) (0.065)
No competitors - - - - ref ref
Other firm and industry no no no no yes yes
controls
Industry dummies yes (64) yes (64) yes (64) yes (64) yes (64) yes (64)
Observations 236 236 236 236 236 236
NOTES: All coefficients are marginal effects from probit maximum likelihood estimation. Robust standard errors corrected
for arbitrary variance-covariance matrix at the four-digit industry level in parentheses. Data are from the 1998 British
Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS); they include manufacturing establishments only. Dependent variable
is a dummy variable indicating whether “Establishment’s manager is able to make decisions on which staff to recruit
without consulting Head Office”. Heterogeneity and frontier are averaged between 1994 and 1997. All regressions include
a control for employment size (current, lagged one year and lagged five years), the proportion of young workers (under 20
years old), the proportion of older workers (aged over 50 years old), the proportion of unskilled manual workers and the
proportion of part-time workers. See text for variable definitions.
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